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1. Two senses of personal identity 
A subject who has a self-transformation behind 
herself—say, a conversion to Catholicism—may say of 
herself “before transforming myself, I was a different 
person”. How are we to understand such a claim? 
Obviously, there is a sense in which the subject takes 
herself to be the same as before and another sense in 
which she considers herself to be somebody else now. 
One possible way of understanding it would be the 
following: Despite the change involved in the self-
transformation, there is enough similiarity between the pre-
conversion subject—S1—and the converted subject—
S2—to say that they are numerically identical. And there is 
enough difference for the subject to speak of herself before 
the self-transformation as another person. 
In my view, such an explanation of the 
preservation of personal identity in self-transformation is 
entirely misguided. Consider belief-revision as an example 
of self-transformation. A subject’s revision of her own belief 
should not be thought of as a change which is a “minus-
point” with respect to the persistence of the subject—a 
“minus-point” that must be outweighed by enough similarity 
over time if the subject is to persist. On the contrary, by 
revising her beliefs, a subject maintains her identity over 
time (just as she would maintain her identity by sustaining 
her beliefs). In other words, the process of belief-revision—
and, more generally, self-transformation—is a process in 
which a subject maintains her own identity irrespective of 
whether S1 is similar to S2 or whether S2 identifies with S1 
(or S1 identifies with S2) etc. 
This means that a proper understanding of self-
transformation requires a distinction between two senses 
of personal identity. In one sense—call it “subject-
identity”—the subject maintains her own identity across the 
change irrespective of the dimension of the change. In 
another sense—call it “self-identity”—the change is the 
end of one self and the birth of another. It would require 
more argument to show that self-transformation requires a 
distinction between two such senses of personal identity. 
In this paper, I will simply rely on this distinction to argue 
that subject-identity and self-identity cannot be constituted 
by the same kind of activity and that this poses a problem 
for self-constitution views of personal identity. (Self-
constitution theorists often use the ambiguous word 
“person”, but I avoid it precisely in order to keep the two 
senses of identity distinct.) In the following, I shall focus on 
Marya Schechtman’s self-constitution view, but the 
criticism applies more widely.1 
 
2. Schechtman’s self-constitution view 
In the second part of her The Constitution of 
Selves, Schechtman is concerned with what she calls “the 
characterization question”. “[T]his question asks which 
actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character 
traits, and so on (hereafter abbreviated ‘characteristics’) 
are to be attributed to a given person” (Schechtman 1996, 
                                                     
1 For reference to other self-constitution theories, see Schechtman 1996, 93. 
To her list, one should add Korsgaard 1989, 1996 and 1999 to which my 
criticism also applies. 
73; subsequent references given by page number only). 
Schechtman distinguishes this question from “the 
reidentification question”, “the question of what makes a 
person at time t2 the same person as a person at time t1” 
(1-2). She says that, in its most common form, the 
characterization question is “which characteristics are truly 
those of some person” (73) and that the question 
“concerns the kind of identity that is at issue in an ‘identity 
crisis’” (74). However, she says that the characterization 
question does not only ask which characteristics truly 
belong to a person but also which characteristics are a part 
of the history of a person at all. In fact, she says that “there 
is a single question—the question of whether a particular 
characteristic is attributable to a particular person—the 
answer to which admits of degrees” (76). In other words, 
the difference between belonging truly to a person and 
belonging merely to the history of a person is a matter of 
degree. 
Before turning to the self-constitution view itself, I 
should stress that the distinction between subject-identity 
and self-identity cuts across Schechtman’s distinction 
between the reidentification question and the 
characterization question. One can ask both questions 
about subject-identity as well as self-identity: One can ask 
what makes something the same person at two different 
times (the reidentification question) and what makes 
something the characteristic of a particular person (the 
characterization question), irrespective of whether “person” 
is taken to mean subject or self. 
Schechtman defends an answer to the 
characterization question which she calls “the narrative 
self-constitution view”: 
According to the narrative self-constitution view, 
the difference between persons and other individuals (I 
use the word ‘individual’ to refer to any sentient creature) 
lies in how they organize their experience, and hence their 
lives. At the core of this view is the assertion that 
individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to 
think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had 
experience in the past and will continue to have 
experience in the future, taking certain experiences as 
theirs. Some, but not all, individuals weave stories of their 
lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons. 
On this view a person’s identity (in the sense at issue in 
the characterization question) is constituted by the content 
of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and 
experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, 
hers. (94) 
Consider first “the assertion that individuals 
constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of 
themselves as persisting subjects who have had 
experience in the past and will continue to have 
experience in the future, taking certain experiences as 
theirs“. One part of this claim is that “individuals constitute 
themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves” 
in a certain way. But what does it mean to say that 
individuals come to think of themselves in a certain way? 
One possible interpretation would be that these individuals 
are already able to think of themselves as themselves—
that they already have a first-person point of view—and 
then by coming to think of themselves in a certain specific 
way constitute themselves as persons (or, in my 




terminology, as subjects). Although I cannot argue this 
here, if Schechtman’s assertion is understood in this way, 
it is unacceptable. If one already has a first-person point of 
view, then one is already a subject and nothing more in 
needed to make one a subject. 
However, there is another possible interpretation. 
Schechtman’s claim might be that thinking of oneself as 
oneself—having a first-person point of view—is only 
possible if one also thinks of oneself in a certain specific 
way. In other words, being able to think of oneself as 
oneself at all is not possible without being able to think of 
oneself in a certain way. But in what way? Schechtman’s 
general answer is that persons “think of themselves as 
persisting subjects who have had experience in the past 
and will continue to have experience in the future“. Her 
central and more specific answer is that to think of 
themselves in this way requires that persons “weave 
stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes 
them persons“. In other words, thinking of oneself in the 
required way is to have “a self-conception that is narrative 
in form” (96). 
I agree with Schechtman that, to be able to think of 
oneself as oneself at all, one must be active in some way. 
It is a further question whether this activity must be 
understood as somehow involving weaving stories. 
However, this is not a question I want to settle here. My 
topic is not what makes an individual a subject in the first 
place, but rather what makes a subject be the same 
subject over time and what makes a future or past mental 
state be the mental state of the present subject. Here 
Schechtman’s answer is that “a person’s identity (in the 
sense at issue in the characterization question) is 
constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the 
traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by virtue 
of that inclusion, hers“. In other words, those future and 
past mental states which are included in a self-narrative 
belong to the person who is the “self” of the self-narrative. I 
shall argue that this answer fails as an account of subject-
identity, though it may partially succeed for self-identity. 
 
3. What is being constituted and how? 
Schechtman works the basic idea I just described 
into a nuanced and complex view. Here I will only mention 
two ways in which she qualifies the bold statement that 
characteristics belong to a person by inclusion in a self-
narrative. First, to avoid assuming that a characteristic 
belongs to a person simply because it is part of a person’s 
self-conception—to avoid assuming that a person cannot 
be mistaken about herself—she introduces constraints on 
what can count as an identity-constituting narrative (94-
95). Here I will not discuss what these constraints are. 
Second, to (among other things) explain how unconscious 
mental states can belong to a person, she says that there 
may be implicit as well as explicit self-narratives. “The 
implicit narrative is understood as the psychological 
organization from which his experience and actions are 
actually flowing” (115). Schechtman knows that this notion 
of an implicit narrative seems to diverge from the usual 
meaning of “self-narrative”. She responds by saying that 
her talk of self-narratives is merely meant to make clear 
that “the psychological forces constituting identity are 
dynamic and active—things a person does—rather than 
static and passive features she has” (117). 
What does it mean to say that a psychological 
organization is somehow the person’s doing? One can 
give the claim two different senses. Consider first an 
ordinary case in which a subject revises a belief on the 
basis of new information or experience. In doing so, the 
person is not only changing her belief but also her 
“psychological organization”: Her old belief having been 
causally and normatively connected to other psychological 
states of hers, in revising her belief, the subject needs to 
consider how the new belief fits to her other commitments. 
In other words, the subject needs to organize herself 
psychologically anew. Since the mental states with which 
the relevant beliefs are connected are themselves 
connected with other states, I simply assume here that all 
the psychological states of a person form one elementary 
unity. 
Second, we can understand the organization 
Schechtman talks about as something imposed by the 
subject on the already existing elementary unity. This 
organization distinguishes between those members of the 
elementary unity which are connected in a certain way—
for example by inclusion in a narrative—and those that lie 
outside of this organization. We might say that this is a 
way of distinguishing between more and  less central 
elements of the elementary unity. 
The two senses are significantly different. When a 
subject adopts a certain belief on the basis of her other 
mental states, she is maintaining her psychological 
organization in the first sense. However, simply by 
adopting the belief, the subject has done nothing to decide 
whether this belief is central among the mental states, 
whether it is important with respect to the unfolding of the 
subject’s life. Thus, the subject has done nothing to decide 
whether this belief is part of “the psychological 
organization from which his experience and actions are 
actually flowing” if this psychological organization is 
understood in the second sense. 
If this is correct, something important follows for 
the self-constitution view. According to Schechtman, 
something the person does decides whether a 
characteristic belongs to her or not. Let us say that what 
the person does is “narratively organizing” her life. If what I 
have said is correct, Schechtman must decide whether she 
wants “narratively organizing” to be what the subject does 
in the first kind of case or whether she wants it to be what 
the subject does in the second kind of case. If I am right, to 
“narratively organize” cannot mean the same in both 
cases. If it meant the same, then to “narratively organize” 
in the first sense would suffice for psychological 
organization in the second sense. But it does not suffice. 
Thus, the two senses must be distinct. 
By “narratively organizing” in the first sense one 
is—in my terminology—maintaining subject-identity, 
whereas by “narratively organizing” in the second sense 
one is defining one’s self-identity. Any defender of a self-
constitution view must decide whether whatever it is that 
the subject does to constitute herself is to be understood in 
the subject-constitution sense (the first sense) or the self-
constitution sense (the second sense). Now Schechtman 
could choose to use “narratively organizing” in the subject-
constitution sense. However, it seems to me that, if the 
notion of a narrative is to play a significant role in her 
account, she should opt for the self-constitution sense. 
She says that “[t]o have an autobiographical narrative in 
the relevant sense is . . . to have an implicit understanding 
of one’s history as unfolding according to the logic of the 
story of a person’s life” (113-114). It seems to me that in 
simply adopting a certain belief and thus maintaining one’s 
identity, one need not be acting in accordance with such 
an implicit understanding. However, when one sorts one’s 
mental states according to their importance in one’s life, 
one is precisely acting in accordance with such an 
understanding. 




Of course, defenders of self-constitution views 
could specify two kinds of activities, one for subject-
constitution and the other for self-constitution. However, 
like Schechtman, most defenders of self-constitution views 
do not distinguish between subject-identity and self-identity 
and defend their views for a kind of activity which seems 
only capable of the constitution of self-identity. These self-
constitution views thus face a dilemma: Either they must 
give up the claim to be offering a general theory of 
personal identity or they must explain what kind of activity 
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